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Abstract: 
We present a tractable model of the effects of nonfinancial risk on intertemporal choice. Our 
purpose is to provide a simple framework that can be adopted in fields like representative-agent 
macroeconomics, corporate finance, or political economy, where most modelers have chosen not 
to incorporate serious nonfinancial risk because available methods were too complex to yield 
transparent insights. Our model produces an intuitive analytical formula for target assets, and we 
show how to analyze transition dynamics using a familiar Ramsey-style phase diagram. Despite 
its starkness, our model captures most of the key implications of nonfinancial risk for 
intertemporal choice. 
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 1 Introduction
The Merton (1969)-Samuelson (1969) model of portfolio choice is the foundation
for the vast literature analyzing ﬁnancial risk, not because it provides insights that
are unavailable in any other framework, but because those insights are packaged
in a form that is tractable, transparent, and easy to use. These qualities make
the Merton-Samuelson model the natural starting point (though often not the
ﬁnishing point) for analyzing any problem where rate-of-return risk is the only
kind of risk worth worrying about.
Unfortunately, nonﬁnancial risks (such as unemployment risk for a consumer)
have proven much more diﬃcult to analyze. Of course, there is a large and
sophisticated literature that carefully examines the theoretical eﬀects of realisti-
cally calibrated nonﬁnancial risks. But much of the economic literature, and
much graduate-level instruction, dodge the question of how nonﬁnancial risk
inﬂuences choices, by assuming perfect insurance markets or perfect foresight
or risk neutrality or quadratic utility or Constant Absolute Risk Aversion, or by
calibrating models to match aggregate risks which are orders of magnitude smaller
than idiosyncratic risks. These assumptions rob the question of its essence,
either by assuming that markets transform nonﬁnancial risk into ﬁnancial risk or
by making implausible assumptions that yield the conclusion that decisions are
largely or entirely unaﬀected by such risk.
1
Often, nonreturn risk is avoided not because economists judge it to be unim-
portant, but because they have a perception that a fully realistic treatment would
entail too much additional complexity. The specialized literature on precaution-
ary saving and heterogeneous-agents macroeconomic models has reinforced that
perception by showing just how much eﬀort can be required to properly analyze
behavior in the presence of empirically plausible speciﬁcations of risk.
This paper oﬀers a compromise. We present a tractable model that captures
the key qualitative features of models that incorporate a serious treatment of
nonreturn risk. Our model is a natural extension of the benchmark perfect
foresight framework, and we show how to analyze the model using a phase
diagram that will look familiar to every economist because of its close kinship to
the Ramsey model of economic growth universally taught in graduate school.
Our model’s tractability springs from our distillation of all nonreturn risk into a
stark and simple possibility: The decisionmaker might experience an uninsurable
1CARA utility with only labor income risk is included as a ‘dodge’ because Carroll and Kimball (1996)
show that it is a knife-edge case that is unrepresentative of the broader eﬀects of uncertainty (notably, the
consumption concavity that holds for virtually every other combination of assumptions); indeed, the presence
of any rate-of-return risk renders the optimal consumption function concave even under CARA utility. (The
other traditional objection to CARA utility is that the optimal consumption plan under CARA utility generally
involves setting consumption to a negative value in some states of the world, which is diﬃcult to make sense
of.)
2one-time permanent reduction in the ﬂow of nonﬁnancial income. When that
decisionmaker is an employed household, this can be interpreted as an exogenous
and permanent transition into unemployment (or disability, or retirement). A
similar risk is faced by a country whose exports are dominated by a commodity
whose price might collapse (e.g., oil exporters, if cold fusion had worked). The
model could even be interpreted as applying to the behavior of a ﬁrm controlled
by a risk-neutral manager, so long as the collapse of a line of business could have
the eﬀect of reducing the ﬁrm’s collateral value and therefore increasing its cost
of external ﬁnance al aBernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996).
2
The optimal response to this risk is to aim to accumulate a buﬀer stock of
precautionary assets, as a form of “self-insurance.” The existing literature has
employed cumbersome numerical solution and simulation methods to explore the
determinants of the target stock of wealth under alternative assumptions. In
contrast, we are able to derive an analytical formula for the target level of wealth,
and show transparently how the precautionary motive interacts with the other
saving motives that have been well understood since Irving Fisher (1930)’s work:
The income, substitution, and human wealth eﬀects.
The literature’s principal other approach (besides numerical solutions) to ana-
lyzing precautionary behavior has been the examination of a generalized approx-
imation to the consumption Euler equation that incorporates nonlinear (higher-
order) terms. The inﬂuences determining the magnitude of the higher-order
terms, especially for a consumer away from the target level of assets, have mostly
been treated as an impenetrable mystery. We derive a simple expression that
shows how the familiar perfect-foresight consumption Euler equation is modiﬁed
in an intuitive way by our one-shot risk; whether or not the consumer’s assets
are at the target, the eﬀect of the risk on consumption growth is related to the
probability of the bad event, its magnitude, the degree of risk aversion, and
the consumer’s wealth position. At the target, we are able to obtain an exact
analytical expression for the combined value of the higher-order terms.
Our chief ambition is to persuade nonspecialist modelers that incorporating a
serious treatment of nonreturn risk is not as hard as they think. (Specialists are
already aware of how diﬃcult the problem can be; but they may be surprised at
how simple it can be, when stripped down to its essence). The treatment of risk
may need to be stylized (as ours is) to preserve tractability, but incorporating a
stylized treatment of risk is much better than ignoring it altogether.
3
2In this case, the convex increase in borrowing rates when cash drops plays the same role as the convexity
of the marginal utility function for a consumer; see also Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2009) for an argument
that senior ﬁrm managers are not risk neutral even if shareholders are, because poor performance under their
tenure will reduce their own future employment opportunities. A ﬁrm controlled by such managers may behave
very much like a risk-averse household.
3In order to assist authors in modifying our model for other purposes, we have constructed a public archive
that contains Matlab and Mathematica programs that produce all the results and ﬁgures reported in this paper,
32 The Decision Problem
For concreteness, we analyze the problem of an individual consumer facing a labor
income risk. Other interpretations (like the ones mentioned in the introduction)
are left for future work or other authors.
We couch the problem in discrete time, but in most cases we provide the
logarithmic approximations that will correspond to the exact solution to the
corresponding problem in continuous time.
4
The aggregate wage rate, Wt, grows by a constant factor G from the current
time period to the next, reﬂecting exogenous productivity growth:
Wt+1 = GWt. (1)
The interest rate is exogenous and constant (the economy is small and open);
the interest factor is denoted R. Deﬁne m m m as market resources (ﬁnancial wealth
plus current income), a a a as end-of-period assets after all actions have been ac-
complished (speciﬁcally, after the consumption decision), and b b b as bank balances
before receipt of labor income. Individuals are subject to a dynamic budget
constraint (DBC) that can be decomposed into the following elements:
a a at = m m mt −c c ct (2)
b b bt+1 = Ra a at (3)
m m mt+1 = b b bt+1 +  t+1Wt+1ξt+1 (4)
where   measures the consumer’s labor productivity (hours of work for an em-
ployed consumer are assumed to be exogenous and ﬁxed) and ξ is a dummy
variable indicating the consumer’s employment state: Everyone in this economy
is either employed (ξ =1 , a state indicated by the letter ‘e’) or unemployed
(ξ =0 , a state indicated by ‘u’). Thus, labor income is zero for unemployed
consumers.
5
2.1 The Unemployed Consumer’s Problem
There is no way out of unemployment; once an individual becomes unemployed,
that individual remains unemployed forever, ξt =0 = ⇒ξt+1 =0∀ t. Consumers
have a CRRA utility function u(•)=•1−ρ/(1 − ρ), with ρ>1, and discount
future utility geometrically by β per period. The solution to the unemployed
along with some other examples of uses to which the model could be put. The archive is available on the ﬁrst
author’s website.
4See Toche (2005) for an explicit but brief treatment of a closely related model in continuous time.
5This is without loss of generality. We could allow for unemployment insurance by modifying the value of
ξ associated with unemployment. On this, see also footnote 4 in Toche (2005).
4consumer’s optimization problem is simply:
6
c c c
u
t = κ
ub b bt, (5)
where κu is the marginal propensity to consume, which can be derived from
κu =1−Þ Þ ÞR where
7
Þ Þ ÞR ≡ R
−1(Rβ)
1/ρ (6)
is the ‘return patience factor’ (see Carroll (2009) for a detailed discussion).
8 We
will show below that the simplicity of the unemployed consumer’s behavior (in
particular, the closed-form consumption function (5)) is what makes the problem
of the employed consumer tractable (given our assumption that the employed
consumer faces only a single kind of risk).
The κu for the problem without risk is strictly below the MPC for the problem
with risk (Carroll and Kimball, 1996). We impose what Carroll (2009) calls the
‘return impatience condition’ (RIC),
Þ Þ ÞR < 1, (7)
which embodies suﬃcient impatience to guarantee that κu > 0. The interpreta-
tion is that the consumer must not be so patient that a boost to total wealth
would fail to boost consumption (for the unemployed, wealth consists in balances
b b b only).
9 An alternative (equally correct) interpretation is that the condition
guarantees that the present discounted value (PDV) of consumption for the
unemployed consumer remains ﬁnite. Þ Þ ÞR is the ‘return patience factor’ because it
deﬁnes desired perfect-foresight consumption growth relative to the rate of return
R. We deﬁne the ‘return patience rate’ as the lower-case version:
þr ≡ logÞ Þ ÞR ≈ Þ Þ ÞR − 1=−κ
u.
For short, we will sometimes say that a consumer is ‘return impatient’ (or,
‘the RIC holds’) if Þ Þ ÞR < 1 or if þr < 0 or if κu > 0, all three conditions being
equivalent.
10 A consumer who is return impatient is someone who will be spending
enough to make the ratio of consumption to total wealth decline over time.
The return patience factor can be compared to the ‘absolute patience factor’
Þ Þ Þ =( Rβ)
1/ρ (8)
6This is a standard result from the literature; a derivation can be found, for example, in the lecture notes
on the ﬁrst author’s web page.
7Table 1 compactly summarizes our notation as an aid to the reader’s memory.
8Þ Þ Þ is the Old English letter ‘thorn’; its modern equivalent is the digraph ‘th.’
9‘Pathologically patient’ consumers who do not satisfy this condition can be thought of as people who
would hoard any incremental resources in order to enable even more extra spending in the distant future.
10Throughout, we casually treat logs of factors like Þ Þ ÞR as equivalent to the level minus 1; that is, we treat
expressions like logÞ Þ ÞR and Þ Þ ÞR − 1 as interchangeable, which is an appropriate approximation so long as the
factor is ‘close’ to 1. In practice, the approximation is very good.
5which is the growth factor for consumption in the perfect foresight model. We
say that a consumer is ‘absolutely impatient’ if
Þ Þ Þ < 1, (9)
in which case the consumer will choose to spend more than the amount that
would permit constant consumption; such a consumer’s absolute level of wealth
declines over time, and therefore consumption itself declines, since consumption is
proportional to total wealth. Analogously to (8), we deﬁne the absolute patience
rate as
þ ≡ logÞ Þ Þ ≈ ρ
−1(r − ϑ). (10)
2.2 The Employed Consumer’s Problem
The consumer’s preferences are the same in the employment and unemployment
states; only exposure to risk diﬀers.
2.2.1 A Human-Wealth-Preserving Spread in Unemployment Risk
A consumer who is employed in the current period has ξt =1 ; if this person is
still employed next period (ξt+1 =1 ), market resources will be:
m m m
e
t+1 =( m m m
e
t −c c c
e
t)R + Wt+1 t+1. (11)
However, there is no guarantee that the consumer will remain employed: Em-
ployed consumers face a constant risk   of becoming unemployed. It is convenient
to deﬁne     ≡ 1 −  , the complementary probability that a consumer does not
become unemployed. We assume that   grows by a factor    −1 every period,
 t+1 =  t/   , (12)
because under this assumption, for a consumer who remains employed, labor
income will grow by factor Γ=G/   , so that the expected labor income growth
factor for employed consumers is the same G as in the perfect foresight case:
Et[Wt+1 t+1ξt+1]=
 
 tGWt
   
 
(  × 0+    × 1)
Et[Wt+1 t+1ξt+1]
Wt t
= G
implying that an increase in   is a pure increase in risk with no eﬀect on the
PDV of expected labor income – a mean-preserving spread in the intertemporal
sense. Thus, any change in behavior that results from a change in   will be
cleanly interpretable as reﬂecting an eﬀect of uncertainty rather than the eﬀect
of a change in human wealth.
62.2.2 First Order Optimality Condition
The usual steps lead to the standard consumption Euler equation. Using i ∈
{e,u} to stand for the two possible states,
u
 (c c c
e
t)=Rβ Et
 
u
 (c c c
i
t+1)
 
1=Rβ Et
  
c c ci
t+1
c c ce
t
 −ρ 
. (13)
Henceforth nonbold variables will be used to represent the bold equivalent
divided by the level of permanent labor income for an employed consumer, e.g.
ce
t = c c ce
t/(Wt t); thus we can rewrite the consumption Euler equation as:
1=Rβ Et
  
ci
t+1Wt+1 t+1
ce
tWt t
 −ρ 
= Rβ Et
  
ci
t+1
ce
t
Γ
 −ρ 
=Γ
−ρRβ
 
(1 −  )
 
ce
t+1
ce
t
 −ρ
+  
 
cu
t+1
ce
t
 −ρ 
, (14)
where the term in braces is a probability-weighted average of the growth rates
of marginal utility in the case where the consumer remains employed (the ﬁrst
term) and the case where the consumer becomes unemployed (the second term).
2.2.3 Analysis and Intuition Of Consumption Growth Path
It will be useful now to deﬁne a ‘growth patience factor’ Þ Þ ÞΓ =( Rβ)1/ρ/Γ which is
the factor by which the consumption-income ratio ce would grow in the absence
of labor income risk. With this notation, (14) can be written as:
1=Þ Þ Þ
ρ
Γ
 
ce
t+1
ce
t
 −ρ  
1 −   +  
  
cu
t+1
ce
t
  
ce
t
ce
t+1
  −ρ 
 
ce
t+1
ce
t
 
= Þ Þ ÞΓ
 
1+ 
  
ce
t+1
cu
t+1
 ρ
− 1
  1/ρ
. (15)
To understand (15), it is useful to consider an approximation. Deﬁne ∇t+1 ≡  
ce
t+1−cu
t+1
cu
t+1
 
, the proportion by which consumption next period would drop in the
event of a transition into unemployment; we refer to this loosely as the size of the
‘consumption risk.’ Deﬁne ω, the ‘excess prudence’ factor, as ω =( ρ − 1)/2.
11
11It is ‘excess’ in the sense of exceeding the benchmark case of logarithmic utility which corresponds to
ρ =1 . Logarithmic utility is often viewed as a lower bound on the possible degree of risk aversion.
7Applying a Taylor approximation to (15) (see appendix A) yields:
 
ce
t+1
ce
t
 
≈ (1 +  (1 + ω∇t+1)∇t+1)Þ Þ ÞΓ (16)
which simpliﬁes further in the logarithmic utility case (since ω =0 )t o
 
ce
t+1
ce
t
 
≈ (1 +  ∇t+1)Þ Þ ÞΓ. (17)
Consumption growth depends on the employment outcome because insurance
markets are missing (by assumption);
12 consumption if employed next period
ce
t+1 is greater than consumption if unemployed cu
t+1,s ot h a t∇t+1 is positive.
Recall that ce
t+1/ce
t approaches Þ Þ ÞΓ as the risk vanishes. Thus equation (16)s h o w s
that risk boosts consumption growth for the employed consumer by an amount
proportional to the probability of becoming unemployed   multiplied by a factor
that is increasing in the amount of ‘consumption risk’ ∇. In the logarithmic
case, equation (17) shows that the precautionary boost to consumption growth
is directly proportional to the size of the consumption risk.
For any given me
t, an increase in risk does not change the PDV of future labor
income, so that the human wealth term in the intertemporal budget constraint
is not aﬀected by an increase in  . But the larger   is, the faster consumption
growth must be, as equation (16) shows. For consumption growth to be faster
while keeping the PDV constant, the level of current ce must be lower. Thus, the
introduction of a risk of unemployment   induces a (precautionary) increase in
saving.
In the (persuasive) case where ρ>1,( 16) implies that a consumer with a higher
degree of prudence (larger ρ and therefore larger ω) will anticipate greater con-
sumption growth. This reﬂects the greater precautionary saving motive induced
by a higher degree of prudence.
To perform a phase-diagram analysis of this model, we must ﬁnd the Δce
t+1 =0
and Δme
t+1 =0loci. Consider a consumer who is unemployed in period t +1 .
Dividing both sides of (4)b yWt+1 t+1 yields mu
t+1 = bu
t+1 =( me
t − ce
t)R, where
the shorthand R≡R/Γ has been used.
Substituting ce
t+1 = ce
t and cu
t+1 = mu
t+1κu into (15) yields:
1=
 
1+ 
  
ce
t+1
κumu
t+1
 ρ
− 1
  
Þ Þ Þ
ρ
Γ
ce
t+1
(me
t+1 − ce
t+1)Rκu =
 
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ −   
 
 1/ρ
≡ Π
12The no-slavery provisions of the U.S. Constitution prohibit even indentured servitude, providing a moral
hazard explanation for why this insurance market should be missing. Adverse selection arguments provide an
even better explanation.
8c
e
t+1 =( m
e
t+1 − c
e
t+1)Rκ
uΠ (18)
where the expression mu
t+1 =( me
t − ce
t)R has been used in the second line.
We know that me
t+1 −ce
t+1 > 0 because a consumer facing the risk of perpetual
unemployment will never borrow. Since the RIC imposes κu > 0,( 18) implies
that steady-state consumption is positive only if Π is positive. From the deﬁnition
of Π above, we need the condition
Þ Þ ÞΓ < (1 −  )
ρ. (19)
Recall that Þ Þ ÞΓ =( Rβ)1/ρ/Γ. In the limit as   approaches zero, (19) therefore
reduces to a requirement that the growth patience factor Þ Þ ÞΓ be less than one,
Þ Þ ÞΓ < 1. (20)
Following Carroll (2009), we call the condition (20) the ‘perfect foresight growth
impatience’ condition (PF-GIC), by analogy with the ‘return impatience’ con-
dition (7) imposed earlier (and recognizing that if   =0the consumer knows
with perfect certainty what will happen in the future; the PF-GIC ensures that
a consumer facing no risk would be suﬃciently impatient to choose a wealth-to-
permanent-income ratio that would be falling over time.
13
Using γ ≡ logΓ, we similarly deﬁne the corresponding ‘growth patience rate’
þγ ≡ logÞ Þ ÞΓ (21)
so that the PF-GIC can also be written
þγ ≈ ρ
−1(r − ϑ) − γ<0. (22)
2.2.4 Why Increased Unemployment Risk Increases Growth Impatience
Under the maintained assumption that the RIC holds, the (generalized) GIC
in (19) slackens (becomes easier to satisfy) as unemployment risk rises because,
with relative risk aversion ρ>1, an increase in   reduces the right-hand side of
(19). This occurs for two reasons. First, an increase in   is like a reduction in
the future downweighting factor (that is, a decrease in patience), conditional on
the consumer remaining employed.
14 Second, an increase in   slackens the GIC
because our mean-preserving-spread assumption requires that labor productivity
growth be adjusted so that the value of human wealth is independent of   – see
(12). The higher   is, the faster growth is conditional on remaining employed.A s
income growth (conditional on employment) increases, the continuously-employed
13The PF-GIC is a slightly stronger condition than is strictly necessary; the necessary condition is (19).
However, the PF-GIC guarantees that the solution is well behaved as the risk vanishes, which lends itself to a
more intuitive interpretation.
14While this eﬀect is oﬀset by an increase in the downweighting factor associated with the transition to the
unemployed state, the RIC already guarantees that the PDV of consumption, income, and value remain ﬁnite
for the unemployed consumer, who is therefore irrelevant.
9(lucky) consumer is eﬀectively more ‘impatient’ in the sense of desiring consump-
tion growth below employment-conditional income growth.
15
The fact that the GIC is easier to satisfy as   increases means that if the
PF-GIC (20) is satisﬁed, then (19) must be satisﬁed.
2.2.5 The Target Level of me
We ﬁrst characterize the steady state. Consider ﬁrst Δce
t+1 =0 . Imposing the
RIC and the GIC, we substitute ce
t+1 = ce
t+1 into equation (18):
c
e
t+1 = m
e
t+1Rκ
uΠ − c
e
t+1Rκ
uΠ
c
e
t+1 =
 
RκuΠ
1+RκuΠ
 
m
e
t+1. (23)
Consider next Δme
t+1 =0 . From the normalized version of the DBC in (11),
m
e
t+1 =( m
e
t − c
e
t)R +1
c
e
t =( 1 −R
−1)m
e
t+1 + R
−1. (24)
The steady-state levels of me and ce are the values for which both (24)a n d( 23)
hold. This system of two equations in two unknowns can be solved explicitly (see
the appendix). For illustration, consider the special case of logarithmic utility
(ρ =1 ). The appendix shows that an approximation of the target level of market
resources is
ˇ m
e ≈ 1+
 
1
(γ − r)+ϑ( 1+( γ + ϑ − r)/ )
 
. (25)
The GIC and the RIC together guarantee that the denominator of (25) is positive.
This expression encapsulates several of the key intuitions of the model. The
human wealth eﬀect of income growth is captured by the ﬁrst γ term in the
denominator; for any calibration for which the denominator is positive, increasing
γ reduces the target level of wealth. This reﬂects the fact that a consumer who
anticipates being richer in the future will choose to save less in the present, and
the result of lower saving is smaller wealth. The human wealth eﬀect of interest
rates is correspondingly captured by the −r term, which goes in the opposite
direction to the eﬀect of income growth, because an increase in the rate at which
future labor income is discounted constitutes a reduction in human wealth. (Less
human wealth results in lower consumption and therefore higher target wealth).
An increase in the rate at which future happiness is discounted, ϑ, reduces the
target wealth level. Finally, a reduction in unemployment risk raises (γ+ϑ−r)/ 
15Note that neither of these eﬀects of   is precautionary.
10and therefore reduces the target wealth level.
16,17
Note that the diﬀerent eﬀects interact with each other, in the sense that the
strength of, say, the human wealth eﬀect of interest rates will vary depending on
the values of the other parameters.
The assumption of log utility is implausible; empirical estimates from structural
estimation exercises (e.g. Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti (2003), or the
subsequent literature) regularly ﬁnd estimates considerably in excess of ρ =1 ,a n d
evidence from Barsky, Juster, Kimball, and Shapiro (1997) suggests that values
of 5 or higher are not implausible. Another special case helps to illuminate how
results change for ρ>1. The appendix shows that, in the special case where
ϑ = r, the target level of wealth is:
ˇ m ≈ 1+
 
1
(γ − r)+ϑ( 1+( γ/ )(1 − (γ/ )ω))
 
. (26)
Compare the target level in (26) with (25) (where ϑ−r =0 ). The key diﬀerence
is that (26) contains an extra term involving ω, which measures the amount by
which prudence exceeds the logarithmic benchmark. An increase in ω reduces the
denominator of (26) and thereby raises the target level of wealth, just as would
be expected from an increase in the intensity of the precautionary motive.
In the ω>0 case, the interaction eﬀects between parameter values are par-
ticularly intense for the (γ/ )2 term that multiplies ω; this implies, e.g., that a
given increase in unemployment risk (say, from 5 percent to 10 percent) can have
a much more powerful eﬀect on the target level of wealth for a consumer who is
more prudent.
2.2.6 The Phase Diagram
Figure 1 presents the phase diagram of system (23)-(24) under our baseline
parameter values.
18 An intuitive interpretation is that the Δme
t+1 =0locus
characterized by (24) shows how much consumption ce
t would be required to
leave resources me
t unchanged so that me
t+1 = me
t.
19 Thus, any point below the
Δme
t+1 =0line would have consumption below the break-even amount, implying
that wealth would rise. Conversely for points above Δme
t+1 =0 . This is the logic
16(γ + ϑ − r) > 0 is guaranteed by (22) under log utility (ρ =1 ).
17We neglect here the fact that an increase in   requires an adjustment to γ via (12) which induces a human
wealth eﬀect that goes in the opposite direction from the direct eﬀect of uncertainty. For suﬃciently large values
of  , this eﬀect can dominate the direct eﬀect of uncertainty and the target wealth-to-income ratio declines.
See the illustration below of the eﬀects of an increase in uncertainty for further discussion.
18Our parameterization is not indended to maximize realism, but instead to generate well-proportioned
ﬁgures that illustrate the mechanisms of the model as clearly as possible. The parameter values are encapsulated
in the ﬁle ParametersBase.m in the online archive.
19Some authors refer to Δme
t+1 =0as the level of ‘permanent income.’ However, this deﬁnition diﬀers
from Friedman (1957)’s and, moreover, is a potential source of confusion with permanent labor income’ Wt t;
we prefer to describe the locus as depicting the level of ‘sustainable consumption.’
11behind the horizontal arrows of motion in the diagram: Above Δme
t+1 =0the
arrows point leftward, below Δme
t+1 =0the arrows point rightward.
The intuitive interpretation of the Δce
t+1 =0locus characterized by (23)i s
more subtle. Recall that expected consumption growth depends on the amount by
which consumption would fall if the unemployment state were realized. At a given
level of resources, the farther actual consumption (if employed) is below the break-
even (sustainable) amount, the smaller the ce
t+1/cu
t+1 ratio is, and therefore the
smaller consumption growth is. Points below the Δce
t+1 =0locus are associated
with negative values of Δce
t+1. This is the logic behind the vertical arrows of
motion in the diagram: Above Δce
t+1 =0the arrows point upward, below Δce
t+1 =
0 the arrows point downward.
2.2.7 The Consumption Function
Figure 2 shows the optimal consumption function c(m) for an employed consumer
(dropping the e superscript to reduce clutter). This is of course the stable arm
of the phase diagram. Also plotted are the 45 degree line along which ct = mt;
and
¯ c(m)=( m − 1+h)κ
u, (27)
where
h =
 
1
1 − G/R
 
(28)
is the level of (normalized) human wealth. ¯ c(m) is the solution to the no-risk
version of the model; it is depicted in order to introduce another property of the
model: As wealth approaches inﬁnity, the solution to the problem with risky labor
income approaches the solution to the no-risk problem arbitrarily closely.
20,21 See
the appendix for details.
The consumption function c(m) is concave: The marginal propensity to con-
sume κ κ κ(m) ≡ dc(m)/dm is higher at low levels of m because the intensity of
the precautionary motive increases as resources m decline.
22 The MPC is higher
at lower levels of m because the relaxation in the intensity of the precautionary
motive induced by a small increase in m (Kimball, 1990) is relatively larger for a
consumer who starts with less than for a consumer who starts with more resources
20This limiting result requires that we impose the additional assumption Γ < R, because the no-risk
consumption function is not deﬁned if Γ ≥ R.
21If the horizontal axis is stretched far enough, the two consumption functions appear to merge (visually),
with the 45 degree line merging (visually) with the vertical axis. The current scaling is chosen both for clarity
and to show realistic values of wealth.
22Carroll and Kimball (1996) prove that the consumption function must be concave for a general class of
stochastic processes and utility functions – including almost all commonly-used model assumptions except for
the knife-edge cases explicitly chosen to avoid concavity.
12(Carroll and Kimball, 1996).
This important point is clearest as m approaches zero. Consider a counter-
factual. Suppose the consumer were to spend all his resources in period t, i.e.
ct = mt. In this situation, if the consumer were to become unemployed in the
next period, he would then be left with resources mu
t+1 =( mt − ct)R =0 ,w h i c h
would induce consumption cu
t+1 = κumu
t+1 =0 , yielding negative inﬁnite utility.
A rational, optimizing consumer will always avoid such an eventuality, no matter
how small its likelihood may be. Thus the consumer never spends all available
resources.
23
This implication is illustrated in ﬁgure 2 by the fact that consumption function
always remains below the 45 degree line.
2.2.8 Expected Consumption Growth Is Downward Sloping in me
Figure 3 illustrates some of the key points in a diﬀerent way. It depicts the growth
rate of consumption c c ce
t+1/c c ce
t as a function of me
t. Since   ≥ 0, the no-risk GIC
for this model implies:
γ>ρ
−1(r − ϑ) ≈ þr. (29)
This condition can be visually veriﬁed for our benchmark calibration.
Figure 3 illustrates the result that consumption growth is equal to what it would
be in the absence of risk, plus a precautionary term; for algebraic veriﬁcation,
multiply both sides of (15)b yΓ to obtain
 
c c ce
t+1
c c ce
t
 
=( Rβ)
1/ρ
 
1+ 
  
ce
t+1
cu
t+1
 ρ
− 1
  1/ρ
, (30)
and observe that the contribution of the precautionary motive becomes arbitrarily
large as mt → 0, because cu
t+1 = mu
t+1κu =( mt − c(mt))Rκu approaches zero
as mt → 0; that is, as resources me
t decline, expected consumption growth
approaches inﬁnity. The point where consumption growth is equal to income
growth is at the target value of me.
2.2.9 Summing Up the Intuition
We are ﬁnally in position to get an intuitive understanding of how the model
works and why a target wealth ratio exists. On the one hand, consumers are
growth-impatient: It cannot be optimal for them to let wealth become arbitrarily
large in relation to income. On the other hand, consumers have a precautionary
motive that intensiﬁes as the level of wealth falls. The two eﬀects work in opposite
23This is an implication not just of the CRRA utility function used here but of the general class of
continuously diﬀerentiable utility functions that satisfy the Inada condition u (0) = ∞.
13directions. As resources fall, the precautionary motive becomes stronger, even-
tually oﬀsetting the impatience motive. The point at which prudence becomes
exactly large enough to match impatience deﬁnes the target wealth-to-income
ratio.
It is instructive to work through a couple of comparative dynamics exercises.
In doing so, we assume that all changes to the parameters are exogenous, un-
expected, and permanent. Figure 4 depicts the eﬀects of increasing the interest
rate to ` r > r. The no-risk consumption growth locus shifts up to the higher value
` þr ≈ ρ−1(` r − ϑ), inducing a corresponding increase in the expected consumption
growth locus. Since the expected growth rate of labor income remains unchanged,
the new target level of resources ` ˇ me is higher. Thus, an increase in the interest
rate raises the target level of wealth, an intuitive result that carries over to more
elaborate models of buﬀer-stock saving with more realistic assumptions about
the income process (Carroll (2009)).
The next exercise is an increase in the risk of unemployment  . The principal
eﬀect we are interested in is the upward shift in the expected consumption growth
locus to Δ` c c ct+1. If the household starts at the original target level of resources ˇ m,
the size of the upward shift at that point is captured by the arrow orginating at
{ˇ m,γ}.
In the absence of other consequences of the rise in  , the eﬀect on the target
level of m would be unambiguously positive. However, recall our adjustment to
the growth rate conditional upon employment, (12); this induces the shift in the
income growth locus to ` γ which has an oﬀsetting eﬀect on the target m ratio.
Under our benchmark parameter values, the target value of m is higher than
before the increase in risk even after accounting for the eﬀect of higher γ, but
in principle it is possible for the γ eﬀect to dominate the direct eﬀect. Note,
however, that even if the target value of m is lower, it is possible that the saving
rate will be higher; this is possible because the faster rate of γ makes a given
saving rate translate into a lower ratio of wealth to income. In any case, our view
is that most useful calibrations of the model are those for which an increase in
uncertainty results in either an increase in the saving rate or an increase in the
target ratio of resources to permanent income. This is partly because our intent
is to use the model to illustate the general features of precautionary behavior,
including the qualitative eﬀects of an increase in the magnitude of transitory
shocks, which unambiguously increase both target m and saving rates.
2.2.10 Death to the Log-Linearized Consumption Euler Equation!
Our simple model may help explain why the attempt to estimate preference
parameters like the degree of relative risk aversion or the time preference rate
using consumption Euler equations has been so signally unsuccessful (Carroll
14(2001)). On the one hand, as illustrated in ﬁgures 3 and 4, the steady state
growth rate of consumption, for impatient consumers, is equal to the steady-
state growth rate of income,
Δlog c c c
e
t+1 = γ. (31)
On the other hand, under logarithmic utility our approximation of the Euler
equation for consumption growth, obtained from equation (30), seems to tell a
diﬀerent story,
Δlog c c c
e
t+1 ≈ þ +  ∇t+1, (32)
where the last line uses the Taylor approximations used to obtain (16). The
approximate Euler equation (32) does not contain any term explicitly involving
income growth. How can we reconcile (31)a n d( 32) and resolve the apparent
contradiction? The answer is that the size of the precautionary term  ∇t+1 is
endogenous (and depends on γ). To see this, solve (31)- (32): In steady-state,
 ˇ ∇≈γ − þ. (33)
The expression in (33) helps to understand the relationship between the model
parameters and the steady-state level of wealth. From ﬁgure 3 it is apparent that
∇t+1(me
t) is a downward-sloping function of me
t. At low levels of current wealth,
much of the spending of an employed consumer is ﬁnanced by current income. In
the event of job loss, such a consumer must suﬀer a large drop in consumption,
implying a large value of ∇t+1.
To illustrate further the workings of the model, consider an increase in the
growth rate of income. On the one hand, the right-hand side of (33) rises. But,
lower wealth raises consumption risk, so that the new target level of ˇ m must be
lower, and this raises the left-hand side of (33). In equilibrium, both sides of the
expression rise by the same amount.
The fact that consumption growth equals income growth in the steady-state
poses major problems for empirical attempts to estimate the Euler equation. To
see why, suppose we had a collection of countries indexed by i, identical in all
respects except that they have diﬀerent interest rates ri. In the spirit of Hall
(1988), one might be tempted to estimate an equation of the form
Δlog c c c
i = η0 + η1r
i +  
i, (34)
and to interpret the coeﬃcient on ri as an empirical estimate of the value of ρ−1.
This empirical strategy will fail. To see why, consider the following stylized
scenario. Suppose that all the countries are inhabited by impatient workers
with optimal buﬀer-stock target rules, but each country has a diﬀerent after-tax
interest rate (measured by ri. Suppose that the workers are not far from their
15wealth-to-income target, so that Δlogc c ci = γi. Suppose further that all countries
have the same steady-state income growth rate and the same unemployment
rate.
24
A regression of the form of (34) would return the estimates
η0 = γ
η1 =0 .
The regression speciﬁcation suﬀers from an omitted variable bias caused by the
inﬂuence of the (endogenous)  ∇i term. In our scenario, the omitted term
is correlated with the included variable ri (and if our scenario is exact, the
correlation is perfect). Thus, estimates obtained from the log-linearized Euler
equation speciﬁcation in (34) will be biased estimates of ρ−1. For a thorough
discussion of this econometric problem, see Carroll (2001). For a demonstration
that the problem is of pratical importance in (macroeconomic) empirical studies,
see Parker and Preston (2005).
2.2.11 Dynamics Following An Increase in Patience
We now consider a ﬁnal experiment: Figure 6 depicts the eﬀect on consumption
of a decrease in the rate of time preference (the change is exogenous, unexpected,
permanent), starting from a steady-state position. A decrease in the discount rate
(an increase in patience) causes an immediate drop in the level of consumption;
successive points in time are reﬂected in the series of dots in the diagram. The new
consumption path (or consumption function) starts from a lower consumption
level and has a higher consumption growth than before the decrease in ϑ.
25
Consumption eventually approaches the new, higher equilibrium target level.
This higher level of consumption is ﬁnanced, in the long run, by the higher interest
income provided by the higher target level of wealth.
Note again, however, that equilibrium steady-state consumption growth is still
equal to the growth rate of income (this follows from the fact that there is a
steady-state level for the ratio of consumption to income). The higher target
level of the wealth-to-income ratio is precisely enough to reduce the precautionary
term by an amount that exactly oﬀsets the eﬀect of the rise in −ρ−1ϑ.
Figures 8 and 9 depict the time paths of consumption, market wealth, and the
marginal propensity to consume following the decrease in ϑ. The dots are spread
out evenly over time to give a sense of the rate at which the model adjusts toward
the steady state.
24The key point holds if countries have diﬀerent growth rates; this stylized example is merely an illustration.
25The eﬀect of changes in productivity growth is essentially the same as the eﬀect of an increase the interest
rate depicted in ﬁgure 4.
163 Conclusions
Despite its simplicity, the core logic of the model as analyzed above is reﬂected
in almost every detail (after much more work) under more realistic assumptions
about risk that allow for transitory shocks, permanent shocks, and unemployment
in a form that is calibrated to match a large literature exploring the details of
the household income process (Carroll (2009)).
We hope that the simplicity of our framework will encourage its use as a build-
ing block for analyzing questions that have so far been resistant to a transparent
treatment of the role of nonreturn risk. For example, Carroll and Jeanne (2009)
construct a fully articulated model of international capital mobility for a small
open economy using the model analyzed here as the core element. We can envision
a variety of other direct purposes the model could serve, including applications to
topical questions such as the eﬀects of risk in a search model of unemployment.
17Appendix
A Taylor Approximation for Consumption
Growth
Applying a Taylor approximation to (15), simplifying, and rearranging yields
 
1+ 
  
ce
t+1
cu
t+1
 ρ
− 1
  1/ρ
=
 
1+ 
  
cu
t+1 + ce
t+1 − cu
t+1
cu
t+1
 ρ
− 1
  1/ρ
= {1+ [(1 + ∇t+1)
ρ − 1]}
1/ρ
≈
 
1+ 
 
1+ρ∇t+1 + ρ(∇t+1)
2ω − 1
  1/ρ
=
 
1+ρ (∇t+1 +( ∇t+1)
2ω)
 1/ρ
≈ 1+ (1 + ∇t+1ω)∇t+1.
B The Exact Formula for ˇ m
The steady-state value of me will be where both (23)a n d( 24) hold. To simplify
the algebra, deﬁne ζ ≡R κuΠ so that RκuΠ=ζΓ. Then:
 
ζ
1+ζ
 
ˇ m =( 1 −R
−1)ˇ m + R
−1
 
R
ζ
1+ζ
 
ˇ m =( R−1)ˇ m +1
 
R
 
ζ
1+ζ
− 1
 
+1
 
ˇ m =1
 
R
 
ζ − (1 + ζ)
1+ζ
 
+
1+ζ
1+ζ
 
ˇ m =1
 
1+ζ −R
1+ζ
 
ˇ m =1
ˇ m =
 
1+ζ
1+ζ −R
 
ˇ m =
 
1+ζ + R−R
1+ζ −R
 
=1 +
 
R
1+ζ −R
 
18=1 +
 
R
Γ+ζΓ − R
 
. (35)
A ﬁrst point about this formula is suggested by the fact that
ζΓ=Rκ
u
 
1+
 
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
  1/ρ
(36)
which is likely to increase as   approaches zero.
26 Note that the limit as   → 0
is inﬁnity, which implies that lim →0 ˇ m =1 . This is precisely what would be
expected from this model in which consumers are impatient but self-constrained
to have me > 1: As the risk gets inﬁnitesimally small, the amount by which
target me exceeds its minimum possible value shrinks to zero.
We now show that the RIC and GIC ensure that the denominator of the fraction
in (35) is positive:
Γ+ζΓ − R =Γ + Rκ
uΠ − R
=Γ + R
 
1 −
(Rβ)1/ρ
R
  
(
(Rβ)1/ρ
Γ )−ρ − 1
 
+1
 1/ρ
− R
> Γ+R
 
1 −
(Rβ)1/ρ
R
  
(
(Rβ)1/ρ
Γ )−ρ − 1
1
+1
 1/ρ
− R
=Γ + R
 
1 −
(Rβ)1/ρ
R
 
Γ
(Rβ)1/ρ − R
=Γ + R
Γ
(Rβ)1/ρ − Γ − R
= R
 
Γ
(Rβ)1/ρ − 1
 
> 0.
However, note that   also aﬀects Γ; thus, the ﬁrst inequality above does not
necessarily imply that the denominator is decreasing as   moves from 0 to 1.
C An Approximation for ˇ m
Now deﬁning
ℵ =
 
Þ Þ Þ
−ρ
Γ − 1
 
 
,
26‘Likely’ but not certain because of the fact that   aﬀects Þ Þ ÞΓ as well as appearing in the denominator of
(35); however, for plausible calibrations the eﬀect of the denominator predominates.
19we can obtain further insight into (35) using a judicious mix of ﬁrst- and second-
order Taylor expansions (along with κu = −þr):
ζΓ=Rκ
u (1 + ℵ)
1/ρ
≈− Rþr
 
1+ρ
−1ℵ +( ρ
−1)(ρ
−1 − 1)(ℵ
2/2)
 
= −Rþr
 
1+ρ
−1ℵ
 
1+
 
1 − ρ
ρ
 
(ℵ/2)
  
(37)
But
ℵ =
 
(1 + þγ)−ρ − 1
 
 
(38)
≈
 
1 − ρþγ − 1
 
 
≈−
 
ρþγ
 
 
which can be substituted into (37) to obtain
ζΓ ≈− Rþr
 
1 − (þγ/ ) ( 1+( 1− ρ)(−þγ/ )/2)
 
(39)
≈− Rþr       
>0
⎧
⎨
⎩
1−(þγ/ )
      
>0
⎛
⎝1+( 1− ρ)
      
<0
(−þγ/ )
      
>0
/2
⎞
⎠
⎫
⎬
⎭
.
Letting ω capture the excess of prudence over the logarithmic case,
ω ≡
 
ρ − 1
2
 
, (40)
(35) can be approximated by
ˇ m ≈ 1+
 
1
Γ/R − þr
 
1 − (þγ/ )(1 − (−þγ/ )ω)
 
− 1
 
≈ 1+
 
1
(γ − r)+( −þr)
 
1+( −þγ/ )(1 − (−þγ/ )ω)
 
 
(41)
where negative signs have been preserved in front of the þr and þγ terms as a
reminder that the GIC and the RIC imply these terms are themselves negative
(so that −þr and −þγ are positive). Ceteris paribus, an increase in relative risk
aversion ρ will increase ω and thereby decrease the denominator of (41). This
suggests that greater risk aversion will result in a larger target level of wealth.
27
The formula also provides insight about how the human wealth eﬀect works in
27“Suggests” because this derivation used some dubious approximations; the suggestion can be veriﬁed,
however, for plausible numerical calibrations.
20equilibrium. All else equal, the human wealth eﬀect is captured by the (γ − r)
term in the denominator of (41), and it is obvious that a larger value of γ will
result in a smaller target value for m. But it is also clear that the size of the
human wealth eﬀect will depend on the magnitude of the patience and prudence
contributions to the denominator, and that those terms can easily dominate the
human wealth eﬀect.
For (41) to make sense, we need the denominator of the fraction to be a positive
number; deﬁning
ˆ þγ ≡ þγ(1 − (−þγ/ )ω), (42)
this means that we need:
(γ − r) > þr − þrˆ þγ/ 
=
 
ρ
−1(r − ϑ) − r
 
− þrˆ þγ/ 
γ>ρ
−1(r − ϑ) − þrˆ þγ/ 
0 >ρ
−1(r − ϑ) − γ
      
þγ
−þr(ˆ þγ/ )
0 > þγ − þr(ˆ þγ/ ). (43)
But since the RIC guarantees þr < 0 and the GIC guarantees þγ < 0 (which, in
turn, guarantees ˆ þγ < 0), this condition must hold.
28
The same set of derivations imply that we can replace the denominator in (41)
with the negative of the RHS of (43), yielding a more compact expression for the
target level of resources,
ˇ m ≈ 1+
 
1
þr(ˆ þγ/ ) − þγ
 
=1 +
 
1/(−þγ)
1+( −þr/ ) ( 1+( −þγ/ )ω)
 
. (44)
This formula makes plain the fact that an increase in either form of impatience,
by increasing the denominator of the fraction in (44), will reduce the target level
of assets.
We are now in position to discuss (41), understanding that the impatience
conditions guarantee that its numerator is a positive number.
Two specializations of the formula are particularly useful. The ﬁrst is the case
28In more detail: For the second-order Taylor approximation in (37), we implicitly assume that
the absolute value of the second-order term is much smaller than that of the ﬁrst-order one, i.e.
|ρ−1ℵ |≥| (ρ−1)(ρ−1−1)(ℵ2/2)|. Substituting (38), the above could be simpliﬁed to 1 ≥ (−þγ/ )ω, therefore we
have ˆ þγ < 0. This simple justiﬁcation is based on the proof above that RIC and GIC guarantee the denominator
of the fraction in (35) is positive.
21where ρ =1(logarithmic utility). In this case,
þr = −ϑ
þγ = r − ϑ − γ
ω =0
and the approximation becomes
ˇ m ≈ 1+
 
1
(γ − r)+ϑ( 1+( γ + ϑ − r)/ )
 
(45)
which neatly captures the eﬀect of an increase in human wealth (via either
increased γ or reduced r), the eﬀect of increased impatience ϑ, or the eﬀect
of a reduction in unemployment risk   in reducing target wealth.
The other useful case to consider is where r = ϑ but ρ>1. In this case,
þr = −ϑ
þγ = −γ
ˆ þγ = −γ(1 − (γ/ )ω)
so that
ˇ m ≈ 1+
 
1
(γ − r)+ϑ( 1+( γ/ )(1 − (γ/ )ω))
 
(46)
where the additional term involving ω in this equation captures the fact that an
increase in the prudence term ω shrinks the denominator and thereby boosts the
target level of wealth.
29
29It would be inappropriate to use the equation to consider the eﬀect of an increase in r because the equation
was derived under the assumption ϑ = r so r is not free to vary.
2223References
Barsky, Robert B., F. Thomas Juster, Miles S. Kimball, and
Matthew D. Shapiro (1997): “Preference Parameters and Behavioral
Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement
Survey,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXII(2), 537–580.
Berk, Jonathan, Richard Stanton, and Josef Zechner (2009): “Human
Capital, Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure,” Manuscript, Hass School of
Business, Berkeley.
Bernanke, Benjamin, Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist (1996):
“The Financial Accellerator and the Flight to Quality,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 78, 1–15.
Cagetti, Marco (2003): “Wealth Accumulation Over the Life Cycle and
Precautionary Savings,” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 21(3),
339–353.
Carroll, Christopher D. (2001): “Death to the Log-Linearized Con-
sumption Euler Equation! (And Very Poor Health to the Second-Order
Approximation),” Advances in Macroeconomics, 1(1), Article 6, Available at
http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/death.pdf.
(2009): “Theoretical Foundations of Buﬀer Stock Saving,” Manuscript,
Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, Latest version available
at http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/BufferStockTheory.pdf.
Carroll, Christopher D., and Olivier Jeanne (2009): “A Tractable
Model of Precautionary Reserves or Net Foreign Assets,” Manuscript, Johns
Hopkins University.
Carroll, Christopher D., and Miles S. Kimball (1996): “On the
Concavity of the Consumption Function,” Econometrica, 64(4), 981–992,
Available at http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/concavity.pdf.
Fisher, Irving (1930): The Theory of Interest. MacMillan, New York.
Friedman, Milton A. (1957): A Theory of the Consumption Function.
Princeton University Press.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Jonathan Parker (2002): “Consump-
tion Over the Life Cycle,” Econometrica, 70(1), 47–89.
24Hall, Robert E. (1988): “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption,”
Journal of Political Economy, XCVI, 339–357, Available at http:
//www.stanford.edu/~rehall/Intertemporal-JPE-April-1988.pdf.
Kimball, Miles S. (1990): “Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the
Large,” Econometrica, 58, 53–73.
Merton, Robert C. (1969): “Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty:
The Continuous Time Case,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 50, 247–257.
Parker, Jonathan A., and Bruce Preston (2005): “Precautionary Saving
and Consumption Fluctuations,” American Economic Review, 95(4), 1119–
1143.
Samuelson, Paul A. (1969): “Lifetime Portfolio Selection By Dynamic
Stochastic Programming,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 51, 239–46.
Toche, Patrick (2005): “A Tractable Model of Precautionary Saving
in Continuous Time,” Economics Letters, 87(2), 267–272, Available at
http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v87y2005i2p267-272.html.
25Table 1 Summary of Notation
a - end-of-period t assets (after consumption decision)
b - middle-of-period t balances (before consumption decision)
c - consumption
  - personal labor productivity
m - market resources (capital, capital income, and labor income)
R, r - interest factor, rate
W - aggregate wage
G - growth factor for aggregate wage rate W
Γ ≡ G/    - conditional (on employment) growth factor for individual labor income
γ - logΓ, conditional growth rate for labor income
β - time preference factor (=1 /(1 + ϑ))
ξ - dummy variable indicating the employment state, ξ ∈{ 0,1}
κ - marginal propensity to consume
ρ - coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion
ϑ - time preference rate (≈−logβ)
  - probability of falling into permanent unemployment
    =1−   - probability of staying in employment from one period to the next
Þ Þ Þ, þ - absolute patience factor, rate
Þ Þ ÞΓ, þγ - growth patience factor, rate
Þ Þ ÞR, þr - return patience factor, rate
ω - excess prudence factor (=( ρ − 1)/2)
∇ - proportional consumption drop upon entering unemployment
R - short for R/Γ
Π - short for
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